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Abstract
A set of n boxes, located on the vertices of a hypergraph G, contain known but different
rewards. A Searcher opens all the boxes in some hyperedge of G with the objective of
collecting the maximum possible total reward. Some of the boxes, however, are booby
trapped. If the Searcher opens a booby trapped box, the search ends and she loses all
her collected rewards. We assume the number k of booby traps is known, and we model
the problem as a zero-sum game between the maximizing Searcher and a minimizing
Hider, where the Hider chooses k boxes to booby trap and the Searcher opens all
the boxes in some hyperedge. The payoff is the total reward collected by the Searcher.
This model could reflect a military operation in which a drone gathers intelligence from
guarded locations, and a booby trapped box being opened corresponds to the drone
being destroyed or incapacitated. It could also model a machine scheduling problem,
in which rewards are obtained from successfully processing jobs but the machine may
crash. We solve the game when G is a 1-uniform hypergraph (the hyperedges are all
singletons), so the Searcher can open just 1 box. When G is the complete hypergraph
(containing all possible hyperedges), we solve the game in a few cases: (1) same reward
in each box, (2) k = 1, and (3) n = 4 and k = 2. The solutions to these few cases
indicate that a general simple, closed form solution to the game appears unlikely.
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1 Introduction
We consider the following game between a Hider and a Searcher. There is a set [n] ≡
{1, . . . , n} of boxes, with box i containing a reward of ri ≥ 0, for i ∈ [n]. We also make a
standing assumption that, without loss of generality, r1 ≥ · · · ≥ rn. The boxes are identified
with the vertices of a hypergraph G. The Hider sets booby traps in k of the boxes, where
1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, so his strategy set is [n](k) ≡ {H ⊂ [n] : |H| = k}. The Searcher chooses a
subset S ⊂ [n] of boxes to search, where S is the hyperedge of a hypergraph G with vertices
V and hyperedges E ⊂ 2V .
If the Hider plays H and the Searcher plays S, the payoff R(S,H) is given by
R(S,H) =

r(S), if H ∩ S = ∅,0, otherwise,
where r(S) ≡
∑
i∈S ri is the sum of the rewards in S. In other words, the Searcher keeps
the sum of all the rewards in the boxes she opens unless one or more of them is booby
trapped, in which case, she gets nothing. If the Searcher uses a mixed strategy p (that is,
a probability distribution over subsets S ⊂ [n]) and the Hider uses a mixed strategy q (a
probability distribution over subsets H ∈ [n](k)), we write the expected payoff as R(p, q).
We also write R(p,H) and R(S, q) if one player uses a pure strategy while the other player
uses a mixed strategy.
This game could be an appropriate model for a military scenario in which a drone is used
to gather intelligence at several locations, and ri is the expected value of the intelligence
gathered at location i. A known number k of the locations are guarded, and flying the drone
near these locations would result in its incapacitation. Alternatively, the Searcher may be
collecting rewards in the form of stolen weapons or drugs from locations at which capture
is possible, or the Searcher could be a burglar stealing valuable possessions from houses in
a neighborhood, some of which are monitored by security cameras. The graph structure
could correspond to geographical constraints. The case of the complete hypergraph, where
E = 2V , corresponds to no constraints on the Searcher’s choice of subset. The case where E
is 1-uniform, so that every hyperedge consists of a single vertex, corresponds to the Searcher
being limited to searching only one location. If E is 2-uniform, so that G is a graph, the
Searcher must choose locations corresponding to the endpoints of an edge of the graph.
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The game could also model a scheduling problem in which there are n jobs with utilities
ri which are obtained from a successful execution of job i. For example, jobs may correspond
to computer programs. A total of k of the programs are bugged, and each bug will crash
the machine so that all data is lost. The objective is to find a subset of jobs to run that
maximizes the worst-case expected utility, assuming Nature chooses which k jobs are bugged.
This work lies in the field of search games, as discussed in Alpern and Gal (2003), Gal
(2011), and Hohzaki (2016). Search games involving objects hidden in boxes have previously
been considered in Lidbetter (2013) and Lidbetter and Lin (2019). In these works, the
objective of the Searcher is to minimize a total cost of finding a given number of hidden
objects. Agnetis et al. (2009) consider a machine scheduling problem in which rewards are
collected from processing jobs and the machine may crash, similarly to our problem. But in
their setting, each job will independently cause the machine to fail with a given probability.
Since this is a zero-sum game, it could be solved by standard linear programming meth-
ods, but this approach would be inefficient for large k, or if the hypergraph has a large
number of hyperedges. In this work, we concentrate on two special cases of the game, with
the aim of finding concise, closed-form solutions. We first solve the case where G is a 1-
uniform hypergraph in Section 2. In Section 3, we consider the complete hypergraph, and
solve the game for three special cases: (1) same reward in each box, (2) k = 1, and (3) n = 4,
k = 2. We also give some general bounds, and make a conjecture on the form of the optimal
solution. Finally, we offer concluding remarks in Section 4.
2 The game on a 1-uniform hypergraph
We begin with the special case that G is a 1-uniform hypergraph, so that every hyperedge is
a singleton (though every singleton may not be a hyperedge). In other words, the Searcher
can open only 1 box, and her strategy set is simply some subset A of the set [n] of vertices.
If the Searcher is restricted to boxes in A, then any Hider strategy that does not hide all
k booby traps in A is (weakly) dominated by another Hider strategy that does. Hence,
without loss of generality, we may assume that G is the complete 1-uniform hypergraph
whose hyperedges are all the singletons. A mixed strategy for the Searcher is a probability
vector x ∈ Rn with
∑n
j=1 xj = 1, xj ≥ 0 for all j.
We first obtain a class of lower bounds on the value of the game, by defining a Searcher
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strategy for every subset of boxes.
Lemma 1 For a subset A ⊆ [n] of boxes with |A| ≥ k, let the Searcher strategy x ≡ xA be
given by
xAj =

λ(A)/rj, if j ∈ A,0, otherwise,
where λ(A) =
(∑
i∈A 1/ri
)−1
. The strategy xA guarantees an expected payoff of at least
(|A| − k)λ(A).
Proof. The expected payoff of the Searcher strategy xA against the Hider’s strategy H is
R(xA, H) =
∑
j∈A−H
xAj rj = |A−H| λ(A) ≥ (|A| − |H|) λ(A) = (|A| − k) λ(A),
where the lower bound is obtained when H ⊆ A. ✷
Recall that r1 ≥ r2 ≥ · · · ≥ rn. If the Searcher is restricted to choosing a strategy of the
form described in Lemma 1, for some |A| = t ≥ k, then it is clear that the subset maximizing
(|A| − k) λ(A) is [t] = {1, 2, . . . , t}. For t = k, k + 1, . . . , n, define
V (t) ≡ (t− k)λ([t]), (1)
which is the expected payoff guaranteed by choosing A = [t] in Lemma 1. Our main result is
that, when G is the complete 1-uniform hypergraph, the value of the game is maxt=k,...,n V (t).
For example, if n = 3 and k = 1 with (r1, r2, r3) = (10, 10, 1), then V (1) = 0, V (2) = 5, and
V (3) = 5/3, so the value of the game is V (2) = 5 and the Searcher opens either box 1 or
box 2 each with probability 0.5. Intuitively, if the rewards in different boxes are lopsided,
then it is better for the Searcher to avoid those boxes with the lowest rewards altogether.
We need a lemma before presenting the theorem.
Lemma 2 For t ≥ k+1, the two inequalities V (t) ≥ V (t− 1) and rt ≥ V (t) are equivalent,
where V (t) is defined in (1).
Proof. The first inequality is equivalent to
t− k
1
r1
+ · · ·+ 1
rt
≥
t− 1− k
1
r1
+ · · ·+ 1
rt−1
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Multiplying both denominators on both sides and cancelling common terms yields
1
r1
+ · · ·+
1
rt
≥ (t− k)
1
rt
,
which is equivalent to rt ≥ V (t), thus completing the proof. ✷
Theorem 3 Consider the search game with n boxes and k booby traps played on the com-
plete 1-uniform hypergraph. Define
t∗ ≡ arg max
t=k,...,n
V (t),
where V (t) is defined in (1). The strategy x[t
∗] described in Lemma 1 is optimal for the
Searcher. For the Hider, any strategy that distributes the k booby traps among the boxes
in [t∗] in such a way that box j ∈ [t∗] contains a booby trap with probability
yj ≡ 1−
V (t∗)
rj
is optimal. The value of the game is V (t∗).
Proof. By Lemma 1, the Searcher guarantees an expected payoff at least V (t∗) by using the
strategy x[t
∗], so V (t∗) is a lower bound for the value of the game.
To show that V (t∗) is also an upper bound for the value of the game, first note that
t∗ ≥ k + 1, since V (k) = 0 < V (k + 1). In addition, by definition of t∗, we have that
V (t∗ − 1) ≤ V (t∗), which is equivalent to V (t∗) ≤ rt∗ by Lemma 2, so yj ∈ [0, 1] for j ∈ [t
∗].
One can also verify that
∑t∗
j=1 yj = k.
If the Hider’s strategy has the property described in the theorem, then the expected payoff
against any Searcher strategy j ∈ [t∗] is rj(1− yj) = V (t
∗) and the expected payoff against
any Searcher strategy j /∈ [t∗] is rj . By definition of t
∗, we have that V (t∗) ≥ V (t∗+1), which
is equivalent to V (t∗ + 1) ≥ rt∗+1 from the proof in Lemma 2. Combining two inequalities
yields that V (t∗) ≥ V (t∗ + 1) ≥ rt∗+1. In other words, opening box j /∈ [t
∗] results in payoff
rj ≤ rt∗+1 ≤ V (t
∗). Consequently, V (t∗) is an upper bound for the value of the game, which
completes the proof. ✷
There are many Hider strategies that will give rise to the property required in Theorem 3;
that is, the Hider distributes k booby traps in t∗ boxes in such a way that box j ∈ [t∗] contains
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a booby trap with probability yj ∈ [0, 1], where
∑t∗
j=1 yj = k. One way to implement such
a Hider strategy can be found in Definition 2.1 in Gal and Casas (2014). Partition the
interval [0, k] into subintervals of lengths y1, . . . , yt∗ . Generate θ from the uniform distribution
in [0, 1] and select the k boxes corresponding to the k subintervals containing the points
θ, θ+1, . . . , θ+(k−1). By construction, the Hider will choose exactly k boxes to put booby
traps, and box i will contain a booby trap with probability yi, for i ∈ [t
∗].
In the special case where all the rewards are equal, we have V (t) = (t − k)/t, which is
maximized at V (n) = (n− k)/n. The Searcher’s optimal strategy is to open each box with
probability 1/n, and any Hider strategy that puts a booby trap in each box with the same
probability k/n is optimal—such as choosing every subset of k boxes with probability 1/
(
n
k
)
.
In another special case when k = n− 1, we have V (n− 1) = 0, so the value of the game
is V (n) = (n − (n− 1))λ([n]) = (
∑n
j=1 1/rj)
−1. The Searcher’s optimal strategy is to open
box j with probability λ([n])/rj , for j ∈ [n]. The Hider’s optimal strategy needs to put a
booby trap in box j with probability 1− (n− (n−1))λ([n])/rj . Because the Hider has n−1
booby traps, the only strategy that meets this requirement is for the Hider to leave box j
free of booby trap with probability λ([n])/rj, for j ∈ [n].
3 The game on the complete hypergraph
This section concerns the extreme case where G is the complete (non-uniform) hypergraph,
so that a Searcher strategy is any S ⊂ [n]. Note that if k = n− 1, the Searcher should open
only 1 box, so the structure of the hypergraph becomes irrelevant; the solution presented in
Section 2 is also optimal.
For the case of complete hypergraph, we present the solution to the three special cases:
(1) equal rewards in each box; (2) k = 1, and (3) n = 4, k = 2. We then give some general
bounds on the value of the game, and make a conjecture on the optimal solution based on
our findings.
3.1 The case with equal rewards
We begin our analysis with the special case where all the rewards are equal, which we set to
1 without loss of generality.
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Theorem 4 Consider the search game on the complete hypergraph with rj = 1 for j ∈ [n],
so this game is characterized by only the number of boxes n and the number of booby traps
k. The Hider’s optimal strategy is to choose some H ∈ [n](k) uniformly at random. The
Searcher’s optimal strategy is to open m∗ = ⌈n−k
k+1
⌉ boxes at random. In particular, m∗ = 1
if k ≥ n−1
2
. The value of the game is given by
U(n, k) ≡
(
n−m∗
k
)
m∗(
n
k
) .
Proof. By symmetry, it is optimal for the Hider to choose uniformly at random between all
his pure strategies.
Because each box contains the same reward, the Searcher’s decision reduces to the number
of boxes she opens. Write F (m) for the expected reward when the Searcher opens m boxes
at random, and the booby trap is located in some arbitrary set of k boxes. We calculate
F (m) by considering the Searcher’s m boxes to be fixed and supposing that a randomly
chosen set of k boxes are booby trapped. The Searcher gets a reward of m if none of the
boxes she has chosen are booby trapped; otherwise she gets nothing. Hence,
F (m) =
(
n−m
k
)
m(
n
k
) . (2)
The ratio F (m+ 1)/F (m) is given by
F (m+ 1)
F (m)
=
(n− k −m)(m+ 1)
(n−m)m
.
Therefore, F (m+ 1) ≤ F (m) if and only if
m ≥
n− k
k + 1
.
It follows that F (m) is maximized at m∗ = ⌈(n − k)/(k + 1)⌉. The value of the game is
F (m∗), as given in the statement of the theorem. ✷
Note that if θ ≡ k/n ≤ 1/2 is held constant, and n and k tend to ∞, then the optimal
search strategy in the limit is to open m∗ = ⌈(1 − θ)/θ⌉ boxes, which is independent of n.
The same result is obtained independently in Example 2.1c in Ross (1983) with a dynamic
programming formulation. Writing F (m) as
F (m) =
(
n− k
n
)(
n− k − 1
n− 1
)
· · ·
(
n− k −m+ 1
n−m+ 1
)
m,
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we can verify that the value of the game in the limit is
lim
n→∞
F (m∗) = m∗(1− θ)m
∗
.
One can interpret (1 − θ)m
∗
as the probability that none of the m∗ boxes opened by the
Hider contains a booby trap in the limit as n→∞.
Suppose now that k is held constant and let n → ∞. In the limit, the optimal number
of boxes to open tends to infinity, and so does the value of the game. To calculate the
proportion of the total reward n the Searcher can obtain, we write out the probability(
n−m∗
k
)
/
(
n
k
)
from (2) that none of the Searcher’s boxes are booby trapped as
k−1∏
i=0
(
1−
m∗
n− i
)
, (3)
where m∗ = ⌈(n− k)/(k + 1)⌉. Because
n− k
k + 1
≤ m∗ <
n− k
k + 1
+ 1 =
n + 1
k + 1
,
the probability in (3) satisfies the bounds
k−1∏
i=0
(
1−
n+1
n−i
k + 1
)
<
k−1∏
i=0
(
1−
m∗
n− i
)
≤
k−1∏
i=0
(
1−
n−k
n−i
k + 1
)
.
Since the upper bound and the lower bound approach to the same limit as n→∞, we can
conclude that
lim
n→∞
k−1∏
i=0
(
1−
m∗
n− i
)
=
(
1−
1
k + 1
)k
.
Hence, in the limit as n→∞, the ratio of the value of the game to the total reward n is
lim
n→∞
U(n, k)
n
=
1
k + 1
(
1−
1
k + 1
)k
. (4)
3.2 The case with k = 1 booby trap
We now consider the special case in which the Hider has only k = 1 booby trap. Recall
that a Searcher’s pure strategy is S ⊂ [n]. In order to present an optimal strategy for the
Searcher, define S∗ ⊂ [n] to be a subset of boxes that minimizes |r(S) − r(S¯)|, where S¯
denotes the complement of S.
We state and prove optimal strategies for the game in the case k = 1. Let R0 =
∑n
i=1 ri.
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Theorem 5 Consider the search game on the complete hypergraph with k = 1. Let S∗ ⊂ [n]
be a subset of boxes that minimizes |r(S)− r(S¯)|. It is optimal for the Searcher to choose
S∗ with probability
p(S∗) =
r(S¯∗)
R0
;
otherwise choose S¯∗. It is optimal for the Hider to put the booby trap in box i with
probability qi = ri/R0, for i ∈ [n]. The value V of the game is
V =
r(S∗) r(S¯∗)
R0
.
Proof. Suppose the Searcher uses the strategy p and that the booby trap is in some box j.
If j ∈ S∗, the expected payoff is
p(S¯∗) r(S¯∗) =
r(S∗) r(S¯∗)
R0
.
Similarly, if j ∈ S¯∗, the expected payoff is the same. Therefore, V ≥ r(S∗)r(S¯∗)/R0.
On the other hand, suppose the Hider uses the strategy q. If the Searcher opens some
subset S of boxes, then the expected payoff is
r(S)
∑
i∈S¯
qi =
r(S¯) r(S)
R0
.
The numerator in the preceding is equal to
r(S) r(S¯) = r(S)(R0 − r(S)) = −
(
r(S)−
R0
2
)2
+
R20
4
= −
(r(S)− r(S¯))2
4
+
R20
4
,
which is maximized by taking S = S∗ by definition of S∗. In other words, the Hider’s
strategy q guarantees that the expected payoff (for the Searcher) is at most r(S∗)r(S¯∗)/R0,
so V ≤ r(S∗)r(S¯∗)/R0. The result follows. ✷
In the case that the rewards are integers, the problem of finding such a subset S∗ to
minimize |r(S)− r(S¯)| is the optimization version of the number partitioning problem, which
is the problem of deciding whether a multiset of positive integers can be partitioned into
two sets such that the sum of the integers in each set is equal. This problem is NP-hard, so
that finding the value of the search game with k = 1 is also NP-hard. There are, however,
efficient algorithms to solve the problem in practice (Korf, 2009).
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Note that the value of the game for k = 1 is R0/4, if and only if the boxes can be
partitioned into two subsets of equal total reward. It is tempting to conjecture that in
general, the value of the game is R0/(k + 1)
2, if and only if the boxes can be partitioned
into k + 1 subsets of equal total rewards. This conjecture, however, is not true, as can be
seen from the simple example with n = 6 and k = 2 when all the rewards are equal to 1. By
Theorem 4, the value of the game is 4/5, but R0/(k+1)
2 = 6/32. Nevertheless, the quantity
R0/(k+1)
2 is a lower bound for the value of the game, because the Searcher can choose one
of the k+1 subsets uniformly at random, and receive an expected payoff of R0/(k+1) with
probability at least 1/(k + 1).
3.3 The case with n = 4 boxes and k = 2 booby traps
This section presents the solution to the game with n = 4 boxes and k = 2 booby traps. The
Hider chooses two boxes to place the booby traps, so he has
(
4
2
)
= 6 pure strategies. The
Searcher would want to open at most n − k = 4 − 2 = 2 boxes, so she has 10 viable pure
strategies, including
(
4
1
)
= 4 pure strategies that open just 1 box, and
(
4
2
)
= 6 pure strategies
that open 2 boxes. While one can compute the value V and optimal strategy of each player
by a linear program, we will show that the optimal mixed strategy for the Searcher is one of
the following three types:
1. Strategy A involves 4 active pure strategies: {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}. Specifically, the
Searcher opens just 1 box, and chooses box i with probability
pi =
1/ri
1/r1 + 1/r2 + 1/r3 + 1/r4
, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Regardless of which two boxes contain booby traps, strategy A produces the same
expected payoff
VA ≡
2
1
r1
+ 1
r2
+ 1
r3
+ 1
r4
. (5)
Intuitively, strategy A works well if r1, r2, r3, r4 are comparable.
2. Strategy B involves 3 active pure strategies: {1}, {2}, and {3, 4}. Specifically, the
Searcher opens box i, for i = 1, 2, with probability
pi =
1/ri
1/r1 + 1/r2 + 1/(r3 + r4)
, i = 1, 2,
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or opens both boxes 3 and 4 with probability
p34 =
1/(r3 + r4)
1/r1 + 1/r2 + 1/(r3 + r4)
.
Regardless of which two boxes contain booby traps, strategy B guarantees an expected
payoff at least
VB ≡
1
1
r1
+ 1
r2
+ 1
r3+r4
. (6)
Intuitively, strategy B works well if r3 + r4 is comparable to r1 and r2.
3. Strategy C involves 6 pure strategies: {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 4}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}. Specifically,
the Searcher opens box i, for i = 1, 2, 3, with probability
pi =
1/ri
1
r1
+ 1
r2
+ 1
r3
+ 1
r1+r4
+ 1
r2+r4
+ 1
r3+r4
.
or opens both boxes i and 4, for i = 1, 2, 3, with probability
pi4 =
1/(ri + r4)
1
r1
+ 1
r2
+ 1
r3
+ 1
r1+r4
+ 1
r2+r4
+ 1
r3+r4
.
Regardless of which two boxes contain booty traps, strategy C produces the same
expected payoff
VC ≡
2
1
r1
+ 1
r2
+ 1
r3
+ 1
r1+r4
+ 1
r2+r4
+ 1
r3+r4
. (7)
Intuitively, strategy C works well if r4 is much smaller than the reward in each of the
other three boxes.
The main result in this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 6 One of the three strategies A, B, C is optimal for the Searcher. The value of
the game is
V = max{VA, VB, VC},
where VA, VB, and VC are defined in (5), (6), and (7), respectively.
The proof of this theorem is lengthy, and we will present the three cases separately.
Before doing so, we first offer some discussion to shed light on these three strategies. With
some algebra, one can see that VA ≥ VB if and only if
1
r1
+
1
r2
≥
1
r3
+
1
r4
−
2
r3 + r4
; (8)
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and VA ≥ VC if and only if
1
r4
≤
1
r1 + r4
+
1
r2 + r4
+
1
r3 + r4
; (9)
and VB ≥ VC if and only if
1
r1
+
1
r2
+
1
r3 + r4
≤
1
r3
+
1
r1 + r4
+
1
r2 + r4
. (10)
Strategy A treats each box equally. For Strategy A to work well, r1 and r2 cannot be
too large compared with r3 and r4 (seen in (8)), and r4 cannot be too small (seen in (9)).
In other words, the four rewards need to be somewhat comparable. Strategy B combines
the two boxes with smaller rewards together, and treats the problem as if there were only 3
boxes. For Strategy B to work well, r3 and r4 need to be substantially smaller than r1 and
r2 (seen in (8)), and r3 needs to be somewhat closer to r4 rather than to r2 (seen in (10)).
Strategy C treats box 4—the one with the smallest reward—as a small add-on to one of the
other three boxes. For Strategy C to work well, r4 needs to be small enough (seen in (9)),
and r1, r2, r3 need to be somewhat close together (seen in (10)).
We next present the proof of Theorem 6 in three sections, starting with the easiest case.
The challenge in each of the three proofs is to show that the Hider has a mixed strategy
to guarantee the payoff to be no more than the corresponding payoff guaranteed by the
Searcher’s mixed strategy.
3.3.1 Optimality of Strategy C
Theorem 7 Strategy C is optimal for the Searcher and the value of the game is VC if and
only if
1
r1 + r4
+
1
r2 + r4
+
1
r3 + r4
≤
1
r4
, (11)
and
1
r1
+
1
r2
+
1
r3 + r4
≥
1
r3
+
1
r1 + r4
+
1
r2 + r4
. (12)
Proof. If strategy C is optimal for the Searcher, then VC ≥ VA, which is equivalent to (11),
and VC ≥ VB, which is equivalent to (12). Therefore, (11) and (12) are necessary conditions.
We next prove (11) and (12) are sufficient conditions. Since the Searcher can use strategy
C to guarantee an expected payoff VC , it remains to show that the Hider has a mixed strategy
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to guarantee an expected payoff no more than VC . Let qij denote the probability that the
Hider hides the 2 booby traps in boxes i and j, and let
q12 =
VC
r3 + r4
, q13 =
VC
r2 + r4
, q23 =
VC
r1 + r4
,
q14 = 1−
VC
r2 + r4
−
VC
r3 + r4
−
VC
r1
,
q24 = 1−
VC
r1 + r4
−
VC
r3 + r4
−
VC
r2
,
q34 = 1−
VC
r1 + r4
−
VC
r2 + r4
−
VC
r3
.
First, we show that the preceding is indeed a legitimate mixed strategy for the Hider.
Using the definition in (7), one can verity that
∑
1≤i<j≤4 qij = 1. In addition, 0 ≤ q23 ≤
q13 ≤ q12 ≤ 1 and q34 ≤ q24 ≤ q14 ≤ 1, because r1 ≥ r2 ≥ r3 ≥ r4. Finally, we see that
q34 ≥ 0, due to (12).
Next, we show that the Hider guarantees an expected payoff no more than VC regardless
of what the Searcher does. Consider 4 cases.
1. If the Searcher opens {1, 4}, then the expected payoff is
(r1 + r4)q23 = VC .
A similar argument leads to the same conclusion if the Searcher opens {2, 4} or {3, 4}.
2. If the Searcher opens {1}, then the expected payoff is
r1(q23 + q24 + q34) = VC .
A similar argument leads to the same conclusion if the Searcher opens {2} or {3}.
3. If the Searcher opens {4}, then the expected payoff is
r4(q12 + q23 + q13) = r4
(
1
r1 + r4
+
1
r2 + r4
+
1
r3 + r4
)
VC ≤ VC ,
where the inequality follows from (11).
4. If the Searcher opens {1, 2}, then the expected payoff is
(r1 + r2)q34 = (r1 + r2)
(
1
r1
+
1
r2
+
1
r3 + r4
−
1
r3
−
1
r1 + r4
−
1
r2 + r4
)
VC
2
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To show that the preceding is no more than VC , compute
(r1 + r2)
(
1
r1
+
1
r2
+
1
r3 + r4
−
1
r3
−
1
r1 + r4
−
1
r2 + r4
)
= (r1 + r2)
(
r4
r1(r1 + r4)
+
r4
r2(r2 + r4)
−
r4
r3(r3 + r4)
)
=
r4
r1 + r4
+
r4
r2 + r4
+
(
r1r4
r2(r2 + r4)
−
r1r4
r3(r3 + r4)
)
+
(
r2r4
r1(r1 + r4)
−
r2r4
r3(r3 + r4)
)
≤
r4
r1 + r4
+
r4
r2 + r4
+
r1r4
r1(r1 + r4)
+
r2r4
r2(r2 + r4)
= 2
(
r4
r1 + r4
+
r4
r2 + r4
)
≤ 2
(
1−
r4
r3 + r4
)
≤ 2,
where the first inequality follows from q14 ≥ 0 and q24 ≥ 0, and the second inequality
follows from (11). A similar argument leads to the same conclusion if the Searcher
opens {2, 3} or {1, 3}.
The proof is complete. ✷
3.3.2 Optimality of Strategy B
Theorem 8 Strategy B is optimal for the Searcher and the value of the game is VB if and
only if
1
r1
+
1
r2
≤
1
r3
+
1
r4
−
2
r3 + r4
. (13)
and
1
r1
+
1
r2
+
1
r3 + r4
≤
1
r3
+
1
r1 + r4
+
1
r2 + r4
. (14)
Proof. If strategy B is optimal for the Searcher, then VB ≥ VA, which is equivalent to (13),
and VB ≥ VC , which is equivalent to (14). Therefore, (13) and (14) are necessary conditions.
We next prove (13) and (14) are sufficient conditions. Since the Searcher can use strategy
B to guarantee an expected payoff at least VB, it remains to show that the Hider has a mixed
strategy to guarantee an expected payoff no more than VB. Let qij denote the probability
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that the Hider hides the 2 booby traps in boxes i and j, and require
q12 =
VB
r3 + r4
, (15)
q34 = 0, (16)
q23 + q24 + q34 =
VB
r1
, (17)
q13 + q14 + q34 =
VB
r2
. (18)
These constraints ensure that
∑
1≤i<j≤4 qij = 1, and guarantee an expected payoff no
more than VB if the Searcher uses pure strategies {3, 4}, {1, 2}, {1}, and {2}.
The Hider also needs to ensure an expected payoff no more than VB if the Searcher uses
either {3} or {4}, so we need to require
q12 + q14 + q24 ≤
VB
r3
, (19)
q12 + q13 + q23 ≤
VB
r4
; (20)
and if the Searcher uses {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, or {1, 4}, so we also need to require
q24 ≤
VB
r1 + r3
. (21)
q14 ≤
VB
r2 + r3
, (22)
q13 ≤
VB
r2 + r4
, (23)
q23 ≤
VB
r1 + r4
. (24)
To complete the proof, we need to show that there exists a feasible nonnegative solution to
qij , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 4 subject to the constraints in (15) through (24).
To proceed, write
q13
VB
= x,
q23
VB
= y, (25)
and use (16) in (17) and (18) to obtain
q24
VB
=
1
r1
− y,
q14
VB
=
1
r2
− x. (26)
To ensure q13, q23, q14, q24 ≥ 0, we need that
0 ≤ x ≤
1
r2
, 0 ≤ y ≤
1
r1
. (27)
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Next, subsitute (25) and (26) into (19)–(24) to rewrite the 6 inequalities constraints in
terms of x and y. Constraints (19) and (20) together become
1
r1
+
1
r2
−
1
r3
+
1
r3 + r4
≤ x+ y ≤
1
r4
−
1
r3 + r4
. (28)
Constraints (22) and (23) together become
1
r2
−
1
r2 + r3
≤ x ≤
1
r2 + r4
, (29)
and constraints (21) and (24) together become
1
r1
−
1
r1 + r3
≤ y ≤
1
r1 + r4
. (30)
Because constraints (29) and (30) make constraint (27) redundant, it remains to show that
there exists a feasible solution to x and y subject to constraints (28), (29), and (30).
First, note that in each of (28), (29), and (30), the unknown’s upper bound is greater
than or equal to its lower bound. The feasibility of x+ y in (28) follows directly from (13).
The feasibility of x in (29) follows from r2 ≥ r3 ≥ r4, and the feasibility of (30) follows from
r1 ≥ r3 ≥ r4.
To complete the proof, we need to show that the sum between the upper bound (lower
bound, respectively) of x in (29) and the upper bound (lower bound, respectively) of y in
(30) is greater than or equal to the lower bound (upper bound, respectively) of x+y in (28).
The first claim follows directly from (14). The second claim states that
1
r2
−
1
r2 + r3
+
1
r1
−
1
r1 + r3
≤
1
r4
−
1
r3 + r4
.
To prove it, start with the left-hand side to obtain
r3
(
1
r2(r2 + r3)
+
1
r1(r1 + r3)
)
≤ r3
(
1
r2(r2 + r4)
+
1
r1(r1 + r4)
)
≤ r3
(
1
r3(r3 + r4)
)
≤ r3
(
1
r4(r3 + r4)
)
=
1
r4
−
1
r3 + r4
,
where the first and third inequalities are due to r3 ≥ r4, and the second inequality is due to
(14). Consequently, we have proved that there exists a feasible solution to x and y that satisfy
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constraints (28), (29), and (30). In other words, we have proved that there exists a feasible
solution to q13, q14, q23, q24 that satisfy the constraints in (17) through (24). Therefore, we
have shown that the Hider has a mixed strategy that guarantees the Searcher no more VB,
which completes the proof. ✷
3.3.3 Optimality of Strategy A
We begin with two lemmas.
Lemma 9 If r1 ≥ r2 ≥ r3 ≥ r4 ≥ 0, and (8) holds, then
1
ri
+
1
rj
≥
1
rk
+
1
rl
−
2
rk + rl
,
where i, j, k, l is any permutation of {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Proof. Rewriting (8) as(
1
r1
+
1
r2
+
1
r3 + r4
)
≥
(
1
r3
+
1
r4
−
1
r3 + r4
)
.
Because r1 ≥ r2 ≥ r3 ≥ r4 ≥ 0, with some algebra one can verify that any other permutation
will make the left-hand side of the preceding larger and the right-hand side of the preceding
smaller, so the inequality still holds. ✷
Lemma 10 If r1 ≥ r2 ≥ r3 ≥ r4 ≥ 0, and (9) holds, then
1
rl
≤
1
ri + rl
+
1
rj + rl
+
1
rk + rl
,
where i, j, k, l is any permutation of {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Proof. Multiplying by r4(r1 + r4)(r2 + r4)(r3 + r4) on both sides of (9) and canceling out
common terms, we obtain
r1r2r3 ≤ ((r1 + r2 + r3 + r4) + r4) r
2
4.
Because r4 is the smallest, it is clear that any other permutation will make the left-hand side
of the preceding smaller and the right-hand side of the preceding larger, so the inequality
still holds. ✷
We are now ready for the main result in this subsection.
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Theorem 11 Strategy A is optimal for the Searcher and the value of the game is VA if and
only if
1
r1
+
1
r2
≥
1
r3
+
1
r4
−
2
r3 + r4
, (31)
and
1
r4
≤
1
r1 + r4
+
1
r2 + r4
+
1
r3 + r4
, (32)
Proof. If strategy A is optimal for the Searcher, then VA ≥ VB, which is equivalent to (31),
and VA ≥ VC , which is equivalent to (32). Therefore, (31) and (32) are necessary conditions.
We next prove (31) and (32) are sufficient conditions. Since the Searcher can use strategy
A to guarantee an expected payoff at least VA, it remains to show that the Hider has a mixed
strategy to guarantee an expected payoff no more than VA. Let qij denote the probability
that the Hider hides the 2 booby traps in boxes i and j, with probability qij ≥ 0 and∑
1≤i<j≤4 qij = 1. In particular, we will show that the Hider has a feasible mixed strategy
to achieve an expected payoff exactly VA if the Searcher opens any one box, and guarantees
an expected payoff no more than VA if the Searcher opens any two boxes. In other words,
we claim that there exists a feasible solution to
∑
1≤i<j≤4
qij = 1, qij ≥ 0, for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 4
(q23 + q24 + q34)r1 = VA, q12(r3 + r4) ≤ VA,
(q13 + q14 + q34)r2 = VA, q13(r2 + r4) ≤ VA,
(q12 + q14 + q24)r3 = VA, q14(r2 + r3) ≤ VA,
(q12 + q13 + q23)r4 = VA, q23(r1 + r4) ≤ VA,
q24(r1 + r3) ≤ VA,
q34(r1 + r2) ≤ VA.
To proceed, write x = q34/VA and y = q24/VA, and use the first 5 equality constraints (in
the left column) to solve qij/VA in terms of x and y for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 4. Use qij ≥ 0 to obtain
lower bounds for qij/VA, for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 4, and the last 6 inequality constraints (in the right
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column) to obtain their upper bounds. The results are summarized below.
1
(r3 + r4)
≥
q12
VA
= x+
1
2
(
−
1
r1
−
1
r2
+
1
r3
+
1
r4
)
≥ 0,
1
(r2 + r4)
≥
q13
VA
= y +
1
2
(
−
1
r1
+
1
r2
−
1
r3
+
1
r4
)
≥ 0,
1
(r2 + r3)
≥
q14
VA
=
1
2
(
1
r1
+
1
r2
+
1
r3
−
1
r4
)
− x− y ≥ 0,
1
(r1 + r4)
≥
q23
VA
=
1
r1
− x− y ≥ 0,
1
(r1 + r3)
≥
q24
VA
= y ≥ 0,
1
(r1 + r2)
≥
q34
VA
= x ≥ 0.
Rewrite the preceding in terms of x, y, and x+ y, to get the following.
0 ≤ x ≤
1
r1 + r2
, (33)
−
1
2
(
−
1
r1
−
1
r2
+
1
r3
+
1
r4
)
≤ x ≤
1
r3 + r4
−
1
2
(
−
1
r1
−
1
r2
+
1
r3
+
1
r4
)
, (34)
0 ≤ y ≤
1
r1 + r3
, (35)
−
1
2
(
−
1
r1
+
1
r2
−
1
r3
+
1
r4
)
≤ y ≤
1
r2 + r4
−
1
2
(
−
1
r1
+
1
r2
−
1
r3
+
1
r4
)
, (36)
1
r1
−
1
r1 + r4
≤ x+ y ≤
1
r1
, (37)
1
2
(
1
r1
+
1
r2
+
1
r3
−
1
r4
)
−
1
r2 + r3
≤ x+ y ≤
1
2
(
1
r1
+
1
r2
+
1
r3
−
1
r4
)
. (38)
It then remains to show that there exists a feasible solution to x and y that satisfies these
six linear constraints.
First, we claim there exists a feasible solution to x that satisfies the two constraints (33)
and (34). The larger lower bound for x is clearly 0, since r1 ≥ r2 ≥ r3 ≥ r4. While it
is not clear which of the two upper bounds for x is smaller, one can verify that both are
nonnegative, due to (31). With a similar argument, there exists a feasible solution to y that
satisfies (35) and (36), due to (31) and Lemma 9.
Second, there exists a feasible solution to x+ y that satisfies (37) and (38), because each
of the two upper bounds is greater than or equal to each of the two lower bounds, due to
(31) and Lemma 9.
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To complete the proof, we need to show that the sum between the upper bound (lower
bound, respectively) of x implied by (33) and (34) and the upper bound (lower bound,
respectively) of y implied by (35) and (36) is greater than or equal to the lower bound
(upper bound, respectively) of x+ y implied by (37) and (38).
From (33), (34), (35), and (36), the lower bound is 0 for x and y, so we need to check the
right-hand sides of (37) and (38) are both nonnegative. The part concerning (37) is trivial,
and the part concerning (38) follows because
1
r1
+
1
r2
+
1
r3
≥
1
r1 + r4
+
1
r2 + r4
+
1
r3 + r4
≥
1
r4
,
where the second inequality follows from (32).
Finally, we need to show that the sum between the upper bound of x implied by (33) and
(34) and the upper bound of y implied by (35) and (36) is greater than or equal to the lower
bound of x+ y implied by (37) and (38). We do so by showing that the sum of either upper
bound of x in (33) or (34), and either upper bound of y in (35) or (36), is greater than or
equal to either lower bound of x+ y in (37) or (38). There are thus 8 inequalities to verify.
For example, from (33), (35), (37), we need to show that
1
r1 + r2
+
1
r1 + r3
≥
1
r1
−
1
r1 + r4
,
which follows from (32) and Lemma 10. Using (32) and Lemma 10, we can also verify the
corresponding inequality involving (33), (36), (38), and that involving (34), (36), (38), and
that involving (34), (35), (37).
We next verify the corresponding inequality involving (33), (35), (38), which requires
1
r1 + r2
+
1
r1 + r3
≥
1
2
(
1
r1
+
1
r2
+
1
r3
−
1
r4
)
−
1
r2 + r3
,
which is equivalent to
2
r1 + r2
+
2
r1 + r3
≥
(
1
r1
+
1
r2
+
1
r3
−
1
r4
)
−
2
r2 + r3
. (39)
Starting from the right-hand side to get(
1
r2
+
1
r3
−
2
r2 + r3
)
+
1
r1
−
1
r4
≤
(
1
r1
+
1
r4
)
+
1
r1
−
1
r4
=
2
r1 + r1
+
2
r1 + r1
≤
2
r1 + r2
+
2
r1 + r3
,
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where the first inequality follows from (31) and Lemma 9, and the last inequality follows
from r1 ≥ r2 and r1 ≥ r3.
We can go through the same procedure to verify the corresponding inequality involving
(33), (36), (37), and that involving (34), (35), (37), and that involving (34), (36), (38). Each
of these three inequalities has the same form as in (39), with the bracket on the right-hand
side having three positive terms and 1 negative term. The key to establish the inequality is
to apply Lemma 9 to the two positive terms with the largest indices among the three positive
terms; for example, to prove (39) we pick r2 and r3 to apply Lemma 9.
Because there exists feasible solution to x and y that satisfies constraints (33)–(38), we
have shown that the Hider has a mixed strategy that guarantees an expected payoff no more
than VA, which completes the proof. ✷
3.4 General bounds
Here we give some general bounds on the value of the game, starting with an upper bound
and a lower bound that are close to each other when n is large and the rewards are small.
Proposition 12 (Upper bound) The value V of the game on the complete hypergraph
satisfies
V ≤
R0
k + 1
(
1−
1
k + 1
)k
, (40)
where R0 =
∑n
i=1 ri.
Proof. First assume all the rewards are integers. If we define a new game by replacing a
box of reward r with two boxes of reward r1 and r2 with r1 + r2 = r, then the value of the
game can only increase, because any Searcher strategy in the original game can also be used
in the new game. With a similar argument, we can replace each box i with ri boxes each
containing a reward of 1, resulting in a new game with equal rewards of 1, whose value is
at least as great as the original game. The value of the new game is equal to U(R0, k), as
defined in Theorem 4. Observe that by further replacing each box with t new boxes each
containing a reward of 1/t, we obtain a game whose value U(tR0, k)/t is no smaller than
that of the original game. Therefore, the value of the original game is bounded above by
lim
t→∞
U(tR0, k)
t
= R0 lim
t→∞
U(tR0, k)
tR0
=
R0
k + 1
(
1−
1
k + 1
)k
,
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where the last equality follows from (4).
If the rewards are all rational numbers, then we can obtain an equivalent game with
integer rewards by multiplying them all by a common denominator d. All the payoffs in the
resulting game will be larger by a factor of d, and therefore so will the value of the game
and the parameter R0. As a consequence, the left- and right-hand sides of (40) will both
be larger by a factor of d, so the inequality still holds. If the rewards are real numbers,
then they can be approximated arbitrarily closely to rational numbers, so that the left- and
right-hand sides of (40) are also approximated arbitrarily closely, and the bound still holds.
✷
Proposition 13 (Lower bound) The value V of the game on the complete hypergraph
satisfies
V ≥
R0
k + 1
(
1−
1
k + 1
)k (
1−
r([k])
R0
)
, (41)
where R0 =
∑n
i=1 ri and r([k]) =
∑k
i=1 ri.
Proof. Consider a Searcher strategy with which each box is independently opened with
probability 1/(k+1). For a given Hider strategy H ∈ [n](k), the probability that none of the
boxes in H is opened is (1 − 1/(k + 1))k. If the Searcher does not open any box in H , her
expected payoff is r(H¯)/(k + 1); if she opens any boxes in H , her payoff is zero. Therefore,
with such strategy the Searcher’s expected payoff is(
1−
1
k + 1
)k (
r(H¯)
k + 1
)
.
The preceding in minimized when r(H) is maximized; that is, for H = [k]. In this case, the
expected payoff is the right-hand side of (41). ✷
It is worth pointing out that, among all the Searcher strategies that open each box
independently at random with some given probability p, the one that guarantees the greatest
expected payoff is given by p = 1/(k + 1), namely the strategy of Proposition 13. This
claim can be verified via elementary calculus. The bounds in (40) and (41) are close when
r([k])/R0 is close to zero. In particular, the bounds are asymptotically equal for constant k,
as n→∞, if all the rewards are all o(n). In this case, the Searcher strategy that opens each
box independently with probability 1/(k + 1) is asymptotically optimal.
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Note that all the optimal Searcher strategies presented in this paper share the same form:
the Searcher chooses each hyperedge S with probability 0, or with probability proportional
to 1/r(S). This observation gives rise to a set of lower bounds on the value, generalizing the
Searcher strategy from Lemma 1.
Proposition 14 Consider the search game played on an arbitrary hypergraph, and let S =
{S1, . . . , St} be a set of hyperedges. Consider the Searcher strategy p that chooses Sj with
probability p(Sj) = λ/r(Sj), where
λ ≡ λ(S) ≡
1∑t
j=1 1/r(Sj)
.
This strategy guarantees an expected payoff of at least mλ, where
m ≡ m(S) ≡ min
H∈[n](k)
|{Sj ∈ S : Sj ∩H = ∅}|
is the minimal—over all possible Hider strategies—number of hyperedges in S that contain
no booby traps.
Proof. For a given Hider strategy H , let A = {Sj ∈ S : Sj∩H = ∅}| be the set of hyperedges
in S that contain no booby traps. By definition of m, we have |A| ≥ m. Hence, the expected
payoff against H is
R(p,H) =
∑
S∈A
p(S)r(S) =
∑
S∈A
λ ≥ mλ,
which completes the proof. ✷
If S is a partition of [n], then the minimal number of hyepredges that contain no booby
traps is m(S) = t− k, and Proposition 14 implies that the value is at least (t− k)λ(S).
Based on the solutions to special cases presented in this paper, we make a conjecture on
the Searcher’s optimal strategy.
Conjecture 15 Consider the booby trap search game played on a hypergraph. There exists
an optimal Searcher strategy with which each hyperedge will not be chosen at all, or will be
chosen with probability inversely proportional to the sum of the rewards on that hyperedge.
In other words, the Searcher can achieve optimality by choosing the best subset of hyperedges
and using the mixed strategy described in Proposition 14.
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4 Conclusion
This paper presents a new search game on a hypergraph between a Searcher and a Hider.
The Searcher wants to collect maximum reward but has to avoid booby traps planted by the
Hider. We present the solutions to a few special cases, based on which we make a conjecture
about the form of the solution in general.
Two of the special cases presented in this paper involve the Searcher opening just one
box, or opening any number of boxes. A relevant and practical situation may restrict the
Searcher to opening a certain fixed number of boxes. If the booby trap only partially injures
the Searcher but does not incapacitate her, then we can consider a model extension that
allows the Searcher to keep going until she encounters a certain number of booby traps.
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